|
| 作者外文姓名 |
Tomlinson, Tom. (美國密西根州立大學) |
| 出版年/論文發表日期 |
1998 Aug. 12 |
| 文章篇名 |
Balancing Principles in Beauchamp and Childress |
| 出版地/發表地點 |
Boston, Massachusetts |
| 出版者/會議主辦單位 |
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy |
| 摘要 |
| In the latest edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress provide an expanded discussion of the ethical theory underlying their treatment of issues in medical ethics. Balancing judgements remain central to their method, as does the contention that such judgements are more than intuitive. This theory is developed precisely in response to the common skepticism directed at "principlism" in medical ethics. Such skepticism includes the claim that moral reasoning comes to a dead halt when confronted by competing conflicts between moral norms in a given pluralistic situation. In this paper, I use examples from the text to show that despite the authors’s arguments to the contrary, balancing judgements are the product of unreasoned intuitions. Given the necessity of some such judgements in any principle-based system, my argument highlights the degree to which principled ethical reasoning rests upon an arational core.（參閱網址） |
|
|
